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Structured Abstract: 
Purpose – This paper investigates the relationship between the quality of property rights 
institutions (PRIs) and bank financial performance in an empirical study of 136 countries over 
the period 1999 to 2006.  
Design/methodology/approach – The quality of property rights institutions (PRIs) and financial 
accounting based measures of bank performance are obtained from the Economic Freedom of the 
World Project (Gwartney et al., 2006), the Polity IV Project, the World Bank data indicators 
database and the International Monetary Fund. Several multiple regression analyses are 
conducted to test the study hypotheses. 
Findings – Our results reveal that the quality of legal structure and security of property rights 
institutions positively (negatively) affects both bank cost efficiency (inefficiency) and 
profitability. The presence of a quality political structure negatively (positively) affects bank cost 
efficiency (inefficiency). The quality of political structure has no direct impact on bank 
profitability. The impact of PRIs on bank cost efficiency is more evident in the upper middle and 
high income group of countries than in the low and lower middle income group of countries. An 
appropriate level of PRI quality is essential to achieve both competition and development. 
Practical implications – The paper highlights policy implications for international policy 
makers, regulators and the management of banks who are interested in banking sector 
development across countries.  
Originality/value – The study investigates the fundamental importance of PRI quality in its 
effect on the banking sector and extends the largely US-focused literature to a broader 
international setting. 
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Introduction 
The banking industry plays a central role in the international allocation of financial resources and 
economic growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Previous studies highlight the influence of the 
quality of property rights institutions such as the legal structure and the extent of investor 
protection, the degree of market development, access to external finance (La Porta et al., 1997, 
1998), financial transparency (Bushman et al., 2004) and firm valuation (La Porta et al., 2002). 
More recently, Gwartney et al. (2006) find that countries with quality PRIs enjoy faster 
economic growth through their enhanced ability to attract private investment. These studies are 
built largely on the institutional theories which highlight the importance of quality institutions in 
financial and economic development (North, 1981). 
   A number of authors assess the impact of bank specific characteristics and macroeconomic 
indicators on firm performance, though the evidence on the strength and direction of the 
relationships concerned is somewhat mixed (Berger and Humphery, 1997; Ben Naceur and 
Omran, 2011; Olson and Zoubi, 2011). Other empirical studies focus on the influence of some 
form of PRI quality on access to external capital (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), firm valuation and 
earnings quality (La Porta et al., 2002a; Leuz et al., 2003), firm growth (Beck et al., 2005), 
operating cost savings (Ben Naceur and Omran, 2011), and firm profitability (Verriest et al., 
2008). However, there is a paucity of previous empirical studies dealing with the impact of 
institutions on the banking industry (Sufian and Habibulah, 2010). Furthermore, the use of 
composite indices to represent governance indicators in these studies makes it difficult to isolate 
the impact of individual institutions on bank performance and to compare their relative 
importance. 
   The purpose of this paper is thus to investigate the impact of PRI quality on bank performance 
across 136 countries, whilst controlling for country and financial market conditions. Our 
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empirical results indicate that the quality of the legal structure exerts a significant positive impact 
on bank efficiency and profitability whereas the quality of the political structure negatively 
affects bank cost efficiency. The quality of the political structure exerts no direct impact on bank 
profitability. Further, the upper middle and high income group of countries exhibit a more 
significant impact of PRIs on bank cost efficiency than the low and lower middle income group 
of countries. This paper contributes to the literature in four respects. First, it investigates the 
impact of PRI quality on the banking sector, which itself is of fundamental importance to the 
international economy. Second, it extends the largely US-focused literature to a broader 
international setting, and should therefore prove useful to international policy makers and 
regulators who are interested in banking sector development. Third, it investigates the relative 
importance of several types of institutional quality measure on bank performance. Fourth, it 
highlights policy implications for the management of banks across countries. In the remainder of 
the paper, we first provide a review of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature, and go on 
to develop the hypotheses. The data and methodology are then discussed, followed by an 
analysis of the empirical results. Finally, the conclusions and recommendations for future 
research are presented. 
 
Literature Review 
Theoretical studies  
This study utilizes the contract and the predatory theories of rule which explain how a 
government can improve economic performance in a particular country (North, 1981). The 
contract theory focuses on the design of contractual agreements between agents in an asymmetric 
information environment. There are two types of rule under contract law: ‘default rules’ which 
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can be modified with the agreement of the parties, and ‘mandatory rules’ which cannot be 
overridden. In contrast, the predatory theory of rule assumes that: ‘rulers maximize wealth to the 
state and combine transaction cost and structural analysis to elucidate organizational differences’ 
(Levi, 2000, p. 829). According to North, then, the contract theory provides a platform for a 
government to provide an effective legal system that facilitates business transactions, whilst 
predatory theory encourages more government intervention to allocate resources among 
members of a society. However, some scholars such as Djankov et al. (2002) refute such theories 
on the basis that government intervention creates private benefits for some interest groups, 
though on aggregate can reduce social welfare. In this context, there are two competing views of 
financial development in the economic literature: the public interest view and the political 
economy view. The public interest view argues that there is a positive relationship between the 
presence of quality institutions and bank efficiency, that is, high quality institutions increase 
market competition and hence cost efficiency, whereas weak institutions negatively affect bank 
efficiency through bank restrictions. In contrast, the political economy view claims that quality 
institutions exert a negative impact on bank efficiency as weak institutions increase bank cost 
efficiency through private benefits to control shareholders and/or industry incumbents.  
 
Empirical studies 
The quality of the legal structure and bank performance 
Previous studies highlight the relationship between legal structure and the extent of investor 
protection, the efficiency of the legislative process, social institutional design, the control of 
business activities, and financial transparency (La Porta et al., 1997; Djankov et al., 2002; 
Bushman et al., 2004). It is commonly held that common law countries provide more investor 
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protection than civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1997) due to the respect for individual rights 
in the English common law system (Bushman et al., 2004), and judges’ freedom to deal with a 
changing business environment (De-Jong and Semenov, 2006). In contrast, stable civil law 
depends on stable legal codes and statutes that need protracted legislative processes to modify.  
   Furthermore, previous studies show that countries with different legal structures tend towards 
different modes of social institutional design and control of business activities (Djankov et al., 
2002). For example, Doupnik and Salter (1995) find that common law countries usually adopt 
microeconomic systems that focus on the survival of individual companies. They typically 
favour a shareholder-orientated corporate governance model which encourages financial 
disclosure to satisfy the needs of several stakeholders (Ball et al., 2000). Conversely, civil law 
countries usually apply macroeconomic systems which focus on the national economy to serve 
the public interest (Nobes, 1987), depending on codified regulations and government 
intervention in the economy.  
   Therefore, in this study we seek to test hypothesis H1 as follows: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the quality of the legal structure and (1) bank cost 
efficiency and (2) bank profitability across countries. 
 
The quality of the political structure and bank cost efficiency  
The quality of the political structure is considered an important driver of financial and economic 
performance (Alesina et al., 1996; Roe, 2003; Pagano and Volpin, 2000). For example, Alesina 
et al. (1996) find a positive relationship between political stability and economic growth, whilst 
Roe (2003) argues that the ideology of US politicians guides the legal system to introduce rules 
that prevent both the concentration of ownership and insider dealing. Consistent with Roe, 
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Pagano and Volpin (2000) argue that public policy and regulation are determined by the political 
interplay of economic constituencies, though claim that the political decisions underpinning new 
legal codes are based on economic rather than ideological principles, and thus the state is 
regarded as an agent of political forces rather than as an independent player. The authors view 
state intervention as resulting from political agreement rather than acting as its cause.  
   Some studies provide evidence on the benefits of quality property rights institutions. For 
example Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) investigate the relationship between bank regulation, 
market structure and institutions, and bank performance across countries. They find a significant 
positive relationship between the quality of institutions and bank efficiency. However, the use of 
a set of aggregate governance indicators to proxy for the quality of institutions makes it difficult 
to identify the individual impact of each institutional variable. Djankov et al. (2002) find that 
countries which enjoy more political freedom have less entry regulation, even after controlling 
for per capita income. They show that more entry regulation across countries usually benefits 
specific interest groups rather than increasing social welfare. More recently, Ben Naceur and 
Omran (2011) find that banks benefit from lower operating costs and enhanced profit 
opportunities in a well-developed banking and stock market environment.  
   Berger and Humphrey (1997) survey 120 academic studies of financial institutions across 21 
countries, arguing that deregulation policies should raise efficiency given sufficient competition, 
thereby benefitting the whole of society. However, such policies may not always lead to 
efficiency improvement due to prior industry conditions across countries. First, government 
interventions in the banking system which may introduce political patronage can fail to provide a 
useful intermediation role and hence worsen the prospects for competitive market development 
(La Porta et al., 1997).  
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   The second reason why deregulation may not always lead to efficiency improvement is the 
issue of bank concentration (Athanasoglou et al., 2008), as explored by the market power or 
efficiency structure hypotheses. The market power hypothesis states that banks in highly 
concentrated markets can set unfavourable prices for customers due to competitive imperfections 
or the existence of well-differentiated products (Berger, 1995). Berger also explains the 
efficiency structure hypothesis which states that firms with superior management/production 
technologies or more efficient production scales enjoy lower unit costs and higher unit profits 
which may earn them a high market share. Existing studies show that, excepting the US, the 
banking industry in most countries tends to be characterized by high market concentration. 
Accordingly, some managers may insist on maximising their own rents rather than maximising 
shareholder value. Even where the intention of management is to achieve greater cost efficiency, 
further development of a competitive market may induce banks to pay higher deposit interest 
rates without an equivalent decrease in bank services or an increase in deposit fees (Humphrey 
and Pulley, 1997). Thus, the development of quality political structures may lead to increasing 
operating costs which become difficult to control. Therefore, in this study we seek to test 
hypothesis H2 as follows: 
H2: There is a negative (positive) relationship between the quality of the political structure and 
bank cost efficiency (inefficiency) across countries. 
 
The quality of the political structure and bank profitability  
There are several studies which examine the determinants of bank profitability in relation to bank 
specific characteristics and/or institutional factors across countries (Molyneux and Thornton, 
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1992; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Verriest et al., 2008; Ben 
Naceur and Omran, 2011).  
   Molyneux and Thornton (1992) examine the determinants of bank performance across 18 
European countries between 1986 and 1989 and find a significant positive relationship between 
the return on equity and the level of interest rates, bank concentration and the degree of 
government ownership, consistent with other studies for the US. Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) 
find in a study of 15 European countries over the period 1995–2001 that the profitability of both 
domestic and foreign banks is affected not only by bank specific characteristics but also by 
financial market structure and macroeconomic conditions.  
   More recently, authors argue that a better quality institutional environment of higher 
competition, lower corruption, and lower entry barriers, impacts negatively upon profit margins. 
For example, Verriest et al. (2008) measure PRI quality by means of composite indices for the 
quality of a country’s entry regulations, level of economic freedom, governance quality, 
innovativeness and legal quality, and find a negative relationship between PRI quality and firm 
profitability in a sample of manufacturing companies located in 56 countries over the period 
1999 to 2006. Sufian and Habibulah (2010) find that overall economic freedom exerts a positive 
impact on bank profitability in the Malaysian banking sector over the period of 1999-2007. The 
authors argue that a lower quality political structure may encourage firms to set higher prices and 
to influence politicians in order to gain private benefits (such as high entry barriers). 
Alternatively, there may be a trade-off between bank revenue extraction and the cost of capital, 
that is, lower levels of property rights may increase the revenue of individual banks but at the 
same time increase their cost of capital thereby reflecting negatively on the return on assets. 
Therefore, in this study we seek to test hypothesis H3 as follows: 
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H3: There is a negative relationship between the quality of the political structure and bank 
profitability across countries. 
 
Data and methodology 
Scope of the study 
In this paper we study a sample of 136 countries drawn from four different income groups across 
the world. The data on bank performance are collected from the World Bank (Beck et al., 2009), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey 
produced by the World Bank for three years: 1999, 2002, and 2006. Data on legal structure and 
the security of property rights institutions are collected from the Economic Freedom of the 
World Project (Gwartney et al., 2006). All data collected are country-level data. The sample 
years are all situated before the international financial crisis of 2007-2008, and thus are relatively 
free from any distorting effects of that crisis on international banks. We estimate some multiple 
regression panel models with fixed effects to test the study hypotheses for the whole sample. 
Furthermore, the sample is divided into two subgroups to test whether the results hold for 
different country income groups. All study variables are summarized and presented in Table 1. 
The macroeconomic variables are obtained from the World Bank data indicators database. 
Certain of the variables such as GDP per capita and inflation are expressed in natural logarithm 
form in order to enhance the goodness of fit of our models (Sufian and Habibullah, 2010). The 
model control variables in this paper are selected and tested based on maximizing the log 
likelihood function (Olson and Zoubi, 2011). Data interpolation is used to derive the return on 
assets and Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) indices to maintain a uniform number of 
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observations throughout the analysis. However, the analysis was repeated without data 
interpolation and the results were found to be qualitatively the same. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The country PRI quality variables 
Previous studies use different proxy variables for legal quality such as dummy variables for 
common and civil law systems (Bushman et al., 2004),  the extent of rights of outside investors, 
and the degree to which citizens are able to use the legal system to solve conflicts (Beck et al., 
2004). In this study we use a more comprehensive set of legal structure and security of property 
rights variables obtained from the Economic Freedom of the World Project (Gwartney et al., 
2006). The variables measure the extent of government protection of persons and their rightfully 
acquired property. The quality of PRIs for the countries in this study is gauged by the Centre for 
Systematic Peace (Colorado State University) combined polity score (POLITY2) which is 
computed by subtracting the institutionalised autocracy (AUTOC) score from the institutionalised 
democracy (DEMOC) score. The POLITY2 variable is a widely employed measure of PRI 
quality in a country as it encompasses several political variables in a single score and is 
computed in such a way that facilitates inter-temporal analysis across countries.  
 
Bank performance variables 
Bank performance is gauged by means of two accounting variables commonly employed in 
previous empirical studies: the return on assets and the cost-income ratio. Data on these variables 
are obtained from the World Bank data indicators database. Return on assets (ROA), a widely 
employed profitability ratio, is measured as average net income to total assets, and reflects the 
ability of management to utilise bank financial and real investment resources to generate profits, 
10 
 
thereby encompassing both management decisions and policy objectives (Sufian and Habibullah, 
2010; and Olson and Zoubi, 2011). The cost-income ratio (COSTINC), measured as total 
overheads or costs of running the bank (the major element of which is normally salaries) to gross 
income generated before provisions, is essentially a measure of bank cost efficiency, or more 
precisely, cost inefficiency, as the higher this measure the lower the degree to which costs are 
under control in relation to income. 
 
Other bank-specific variables 
Previous empirical studies may be criticised for a lack of consistency in the selection of bank and 
industry specific characteristics (Athanasoglou et al., 2008). To address this issue, we select 
several bank-specific control variables on the basis of maximizing the log likelihood function 
from a likelihood ratio test (consistent with the approach of Olson and Zoubi, 2011). First, net 
interest margin (INTM) is computed as the accounting value of a bank’s net interest revenue as a 
proportion of its interest-bearing assets. Second, overhead cost (OVHD) is measured as total 
overhead costs divided by total assets. Third, whilst bank size can be measured in a number of 
different ways, we choose to measure it as deposit money bank assets scaled by gross domestic 
production (DMBA). Fourth, bank market capitalization (MCAP) is represented as the natural 
logarithm of a bank’s share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. Fifth, bank 
concentration (BCONC) shows the assets of the three largest banks as a share of the assets of all 
commercial banks in a given country. Sixth, government ownership (GOV) is measured as the 
fraction of a banking system's assets that are 50% or greater government owned. Other potential 
control variables such as liquidity, non-performing loans, the interest spread, risk portfolio, 
private credit, and activity (Beck et al., 2005, Athanasoglou et al., 2008, Lensink et al., 2008) are 
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found either to be insignificant or to evidence weaker significance than those control variables 
selected, and hence are excluded from the analysis. It might be argued in any case that the 
excluded variables are already proxied by the other explanatory variables included (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997).  
 
Macroeconomic variables 
The macroeconomic variables selected in this paper are GDP per capita, the GDP growth rate, 
the real interest rate, and inflation, with all variables sourced from the International Monetary 
Fund (World Economic Outlook database). The GDP per capita (GDP/CAP) variable is included 
to gauge the size of the economy, whilst the GDP growth rate (GDPG) proxies for general 
economic development across sample countries. The real interest rate (RIR) represents the 
lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. The inflation 
variable is measured as the natural logarithm of average consumer index values (whereby the 
year 2000 base value equals 100 across countries), and is included on the basis that banks 
typically generate greater profits in inflationary environments (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004). 
 
The models 
We estimate four sets of models in our study. The first set of models examines the relationship 
between bank cost inefficiency and PRI quality. The general model specification is given in 
Equation 1. We estimate eight different model specifications to avoid potential multicollinearity 
between model variables. 
ln(CSTNC)it = α + β1 ln(OVHD)it + β2 ln(INTM)it +  β3 ln(DMBA)it + β4ln(MCAP)it  
                           + β5(BCONC)it + β6(GOV)it + β7ln(GDP/CAP)it + β8ln(INF)it  
                           + β9(GDPG)it + β10(RIR)it + β11(LS)it + β12(POLITY2)it  + β13(SG)it +  
                           + β14(SM)it + β15(FT)it + β16(REG)it + β17(SI)it + εit             (1) 
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Where: lnCSTNC = Natural logarithm of the cost-income ratio; lnOVHD  = Natural logarithm of 
overhead costs/total assets; lnINTM = Natural logarithm of the net interest margin; lnDMBA = 
Natural logarithm of deposit money bank assets/GDP; lnMCAP = Natural logarithm of market 
capitalization; BCONC = Bank concentration; GOV = Government ownership of banks; 
lnGDP/CAP = Natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita; lnINF = Natural 
logarithm of consumer price index; GDPG = Gross domestic product growth rate; RIR = Real 
interest rate; LS = Legal structure, POLITY2 = Property rights institutions quality score; SG = 
Size of government; SM = Sound money; FT = Free trade; REG = Regulations; and SI = 
Summary index of size of government, legal system, sound money, freedom to trade and 
regulation indices. 
    
   The second set of models also examines the relationship between bank cost inefficiency and 
PRI quality, though this time by country income level, employing the same model specification 
given in Equation 1. The model specifications relate to low income, lower middle income, upper 
middle income, and high income groups of countries, respectively. 
   The third set of models estimated examines the relationship between bank profitability and PRI 
quality. The general model specification is given in Equation 2 and we estimate eight different 
model specifications to avoid potential multicollinearity between the model variables. 
ln(ROA)it = α + β1ln(OVHD)it + β2ln(INTM)it +  β3ln(DMBA)it + β4ln(MCAP)it  
                           + β5(BCONC)it + β6(GOV)it + β7 ln(GDP/CAP)it + β8 ln(INF)it  
                           + β9(GDPG)it + β10(RIR)it + β11ln(CSTNC)it + β12(LS)it + β13(POLITY2)it   
                           + β14(SG)it + + β15(SM)it + β16(FT)it  
                           + β17(REG)it + β18(SI)it + εit                                                              (2) 
 
Where the variable definitions are as above, with the addition of lnROA defined as the natural 
logarithm of the return on assets. 
     
   The fourth set of models estimated examines the relationship between bank profitability and 
PRI quality, though this time by country income level, with the general specification as given in 
Equation 2. 
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Results and discussion 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the model variables 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the model variables of this paper. In our study, the 
quality of the legal structure and the security of property rights index (LS) variable is scaled from 
0 to 10, where 10 represents high government protection. We observe a tendency towards a 
developed legal structure with a mean value of 5.63 across countries. The quality of the political 
structure  variable (POLITY2) covers the entire range from -10 to +10 across countries, and it has 
a mean of less than 4, hence there is a tendency towards institutionalised democracy, though this 
is far from universal across countries. In terms of bank performance, omitting the natural 
logarithm prefix, banks tend to exhibit a high cost-income ratio (COSTINC) of almost 67%, with 
a low return on assets (ROA) of 1% (not shown in Table 2 for reasons of brevity). However, for 
both measures, the standard deviation is high across the sample countries, implying a very wide 
distribution for each variable.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
   Before modelling bank cost efficiency and profitability, it is important to examine correlations 
between the key model variables. The correlation matrix presented in Table 3 reveals some 
significant relationships across the variables. For example, bank cost inefficiency (CSTNC) is 
significantly negatively correlated with the quality of the legal structure (LS), returns on assets 
(ROA), overhead costs (OVHD), and net interest margin (INTM), and has a significant positive 
relationship with the quality of the political structure (POLITY2) in our sample. The return on 
assets variable is significantly positively correlated with net interest margin and significantly 
negatively correlated with bank size (DMBA) and the quality of legal and political structures. 
Importantly, PRI quality exhibits a significant correlation with several of the control variables, 
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and thus we need to address the potential issue of multicollinearity in the statistical analysis and 
modelling. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
An analysis of variance of the study variables 
A one way analysis of variance of bank performance characteristics and external institutional 
environment factors across banks in different income groups is reported in Table 4.  
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
   The internal bank performance characteristics and external institutional environment factors 
differ significantly across income groups, with the exception of our cost inefficiency measure.   
Similarly, other bank-specific variables differ significantly across income groups (not shown in 
Table 4 for reasons of brevity). The results show that the variance within groups is much greater 
than the variance between groups for all bank performance characteristics and institutional 
variables across the four income groups at the 5% level, with the exception of bank cost 
inefficiency (the cost to income ratio), thereby confirming the need to incorporate country 
income grouping into our modelling strategy.  
 
The impact of PRI quality on cost efficiency 
Table 5 reports eight different specifications of a model of bank cost inefficiency against PRI 
quality and the firm-level and macroeconomic control variables. Model 1 contains the control 
variables alone and reveals that banks with higher overhead costs and lower interest margins tend 
to suffer from significantly higher cost inefficiency, consistent with the predictions of Olson and 
Zoubi (2011). The model captures a significant proportion of the variation in cost inefficiency, 
with an F-statistic significant at the 1% level, and an adjusted R2 of 0.39. 
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
   In model 2, we add the quality of the legal structure variable and find that it is a significant 
negative driver of cost inefficiency at the 5% level. Thus, as expected, the presence of quality 
PRIs significantly increases the cost efficiency of banks. The model produces an F-statistic 
significant at the 1% level, and an adjusted R2 of 0.38.  
   In models 3 to 8 we include the quality of the political structure and other Economic Freedom 
of the World (EFW) indices to investigate the relative importance of other institutions to bank 
efficiency, in turn, and find that the quality of the legal structure maintains its significance, with 
a negative impact, consistent with existing study predictions. Interestingly, adding the quality of 
the political structure decreases bank efficiency in model 3, while more freedom of trade reduces 
bank efficiency in model 6. The sound money, regulation and EFW summary index variables 
show no impact on bank efficiency in models 5, 7 and 8. In terms of model diagnostics, the 
maximum/minimum Value Inflation Factors (VIF) for the models are all below the benchmark of 
5 degrees, indicating an absence of significant multicollinearity (Studenmund, 2006), and the 
Goldfeld–Quandt (1965) test statistic is insignificant. On the basis of the estimated models of 
bank cost efficiency, then, hypothesis H1 is not rejected as efficiency (inefficiency) is positively 
(negatively) related to the quality of legal structures. Similarly, hypothesis H2 is not rejected as 
efficiency (inefficiency) is negatively (positively) related to the quality of political structures. 
The presence of better quality political structures would appear to lead to greater industry 
competition, lower entry barriers, and ultimately increased costs for banks as they strive to be 
more competitive and retain/grow their market shares.  
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The impact of PRI quality on bank profitability  
We next analyse the drivers of bank profitability (defined here as the return on assets), focusing 
in particular on PRI quality. Model 1 in Table 6 shows that the cost to income ratio is a 
significant negative determinant of bank profitability at the 1% level, consistent with 
Athanasoglou et al. (2008), and Olson and Zoubi (2011). Overhead costs are a significant 
positive determinant, perhaps due to an interaction with the cost to income ratio, while 
government ownership exhibits a significant negative relationship with bank profitability, as 
expected, though only at the 10% level. Thus, more profitable banks tend to be more cost 
efficient and lend more in relation to their ownership structure than less profitable banks. All of 
the models exhibit a significant F-statistic at the 1% level. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
   Model 1 has an adjusted R2 of 0.34. We add the quality of the legal structure in model 2 and 
observe a significant positive impact on profitability across the models. Interestingly, the quality 
of the political structure has no impact in model 3 while the sound money variable in model 5 
exerts a significant negative impact on bank profitability at the 5% level. 
   The VIF test for all models confirms the absence of significant multicollinearity and the 
Goldfeld-Quandt test statistic shows no sign of significant heteroscedasticity. In summary, 
hypothesis H1 is not rejected as bank profitability is positively related to the quality of legal 
structures. Conversely, hypothesis H3 is rejected due to the absence of a significant negative 
relationship between the quality of political structures and bank profitability across countries. 
This result contrasts with the findings of Verriest et al. (2008) for the manufacturing sector, as 
the banking industry is heavily regulated and supervised, thereby hindering banks from enjoying 
high (interest) margins compared to other sectors of the economy. The main purpose of this 
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regulation is to safeguard the financial system and to ensure the soundness of bank fiduciary 
responsibilities (Sufian and Habibulah, 2010). Thus, whilst there is evidence of a positive 
relationship between the quality of legal structures, efficiency and profitability in banks on an 
international basis, there is a positive effect between the quality of political structures and cost 
inefficiency though no apparent impact on bank profitability. 
 
The impact of PRI quality on cost efficiency by country income level 
To examine whether country income level exerts an impact on the relationship between cost 
efficiency in banks and PRI quality, we estimate models by country income level subgroup and 
report the results in the first two columns of Table 7. We present two models, with banks in low 
and lower middle income countries in model 1 and banks in upper middle and high income 
countries in model 2. Interestingly, although the quality of legal structures tends to increase 
(reduce) cost efficiency (inefficiency) across the country income group models, this positive 
(negative) impact is only a significant driver in the upper middle and high income group of 
countries (model 2) where it is significant at the 1% level. Further, our results show that the 
quality of political structures significantly reduces bank efficiency only in upper middle and high 
income of countries (model 2) at the 5% level. Thus, the erosion of bank efficiency as the quality 
of political structures increases tends to have its greatest impact in upper middle and high income 
countries. This latter model has an adjusted R2 of 0.45 and a significant F-statistic at the 1% 
level. This can be partly explained in that the existence of high quality property rights institutions 
in high income countries may reduce the marginal benefits from any further institutional 
improvements which may give rise to a nonlinear relationship between quality institutions and 
bank performance. This relationship would benefit from further investigation in the future. 
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 [Insert Table 7 here] 
   In terms of the model control variables, increasing overheads tend to promote higher cost 
inefficiency whereas higher interest margins tend to lead to lower cost inefficiency, the latter 
marginally more evident in the lower income group of countries.  
 
The impact of PRI quality on profitability by country income level 
The third and fourth columns of Table 7 report the results of models of bank profitability after 
controlling for country income level. The cost to income ratio is a significant negative 
determinant of profitability across models 3 and 4, though at different significance levels, whilst 
the overhead cost is a significant positive determinant at the 1% level. Thus, more profitable 
banks tend to have a lower cost to income ratio which makes logical sense. Interestingly, the 
quality of legal structures maintains a positive impact on bank profitability across all income 
groups (models 3 and 4) at the 5% level. Conversely, the quality of political structures has no 
impact on bank profitability across country income groups. The adjusted R2 statistics are 0.39 for 
model 3 and 0.38 for model 4, with overall F-statistics significant at the 10% and 1% levels, 
respectively. Thus, PRI quality appears to exert a differing strength of impact on profitability 
across country income groups. 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
This paper investigates the impact of PRI quality on the cost efficiency and profitability of banks 
across 136 countries over the period 1999 to 2006. We find that the quality of the legal structure 
and security of property rights institutions positively affects bank cost efficiency and 
profitability, consistent with our predictions. In addition, our evidence suggests that banks in 
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high quality political structure countries suffer from low cost efficiency, though this result relates 
mainly to upper middle and high income countries. It is argued that cost inefficiencies may arise 
here from the inability of banks to generate new sources of revenue and/or reduce operating costs 
to tackle the increasing competition that accompanies an increase in PRI quality. Further, we find 
some support for the political economy view and the market power hypothesis in upper middle 
and high middle income countries within which banks may suffer from lower efficiency in the 
face of bank concentration and/or competition. The impact of PRIs on bank cost efficiency is 
more evident in the upper middle and high income group of countries than in the low and lower 
middle income group of countries. 
   One implication of our results is that the cost structure of banks varies across countries with 
different legal and political environments. The senior management of transnational banks should 
employ appropriate operating income and cost strategies to respond to differences in PRI quality 
across countries in order to maximize shareholder wealth. International policy makers and 
regulators should work to reduce any competitive inequality due to international differences in 
PRI quality to maintain financial stability and foster financial globalization. Our study has 
certain limitations in that it focuses on large banks as a result of data availability issues with 
smaller banks, and it does not test the effect of quality institutions on different types of banks, 
which may limit the generalizability of our results. Future studies might include various 
intermediary policy channels such as taxation through which PRI quality may affect bank 
performance. 
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Table 1 
Summary of variables and source of data 
All data collected are country-level data 
 
 
Panel A: Bank performance  
LnCost/Income (CSTINC) The natural logarithm of total overhead costs to gross income. The World Bank  
LnReturn on Assets (ROA) The natural logarithm of average net income to total assets. The World Bank 
Panel B: Bank specific characteristics  
LnOverhead (OVHD) The natural logarithm of total overhead costs divided by total assets. The World Bank  
LnNet Interest 
Margin(INTM) 
The natural logarithm of a bank’s net interest revenue as a proportion of its interest-
bearing assets. 
The World Bank 
LnAssets/GDP (DMBA) The natural logarithm of deposit money bank assets scaled by gross domestic 
production. 
The World Bank 
LnMarket Cap. (MCAP) The natural logarithm of share price times the number of shares outstanding. Listed 
domestic companies are those domestically incorporated companies listed on a 
country's stock exchange(s) at the end of the year. 
The World Bank 
Bank Concentration 
(BCONC) 
The assets of three largest banks as a share of the assets of all commercial banks. The World Bank 
Government ownership 
(GOV) 
The fraction of the banking system's assets that are 50% or more government owned.  The World Bank 
Panel C: Macroeconomic environment  
LnGDP/CAP (GDP/CAP) The natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita. The World Bank 
LnIflation (INF) The natural logarithm of the inflation rate. The World Bank 
GDP growth (GDPG) The natural logarithm of gross domestic product growth. The World Bank 
Real Interest rate (RIR) The lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. The World Bank 
Panel D: Property rights institutions  
Legal Structure (LS) The extent of government protection of persons and their rightfully acquired property. 
It includes the level of judicial independence, impartial courts, protection of property 
rights, military interference in the rule of law and the political process, integrity of the 
legal system, legal enforcement of contracts, and regulatory restrictions on the sale of 
real property. Scaled from 0 to 10, where 10 represents high government protection. 
Gwartney et al. 
(2006) 
Political structure 
(POLITY2) 
The extent of quality institution for the distribution of political power among 
members of a society, and constraints on executive performance. It is measured by 
subtracting the institutionalised autocracy score from the institutionalised democracy 
score. Scaled from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). 
Centre for 
Systematic Peace 
(CSP) 
Size of government (SG) The extent to which countries rely on the government to allocate resources and goods 
and services. Scaled from 0 to 10, with 10 representing a significant sized 
government. 
Gwartney et al. 
(2006) 
Sound money (SM) The extent of the consistency of monetary policy (or institutions) with long-term price 
stability and the ease with which other currencies can be used via domestic and 
foreign bank accounts. Scaled from 0 to 10, where 10 represents more sound 
monetary policy. 
Gwartney et al. 
(2006) 
Freedom to trade(FT) The extent of international exchange restraints such as tariffs, quotas, hidden 
administrative restraints, and controls on exchange rates and capital. Scaled from 0 to 
10, where 10 represent more freedom to trade. 
Gwartney et al. 
(2006) 
Regulation (REG) The extent of regulatory restraints that limit freedom of exchange in the credit, labour, 
and product markets. Scaled from 0 to 10, where 10 represents more freedom of 
exchange. 
Gwartney et al. 
(2006) 
Summary index(SI) An average summary index of the legal structure, size of government, sound money, 
freedom to trade and regulation indices. Scaled from 0 to 10, where 10 represents 
more economic freedom. 
Gwartney et al. 
(2006) 
YR Dummy variable for the year effect that takes a value of 1, 2, or 3 if year is 1999, 
2002, or 2006, respectively. 
 
25 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for the study variables 
 
  Observations Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. 
Panel A: Bank performance 
LnCost/Income (CSTINC) 158 -1.26 .59 -.45 .30 
LnReturn on Assets (ROA) 158 -8.11 -1.96 -4.31 .74 
Panel B: Bank specific characteristics 
LnOverhead (OVHD) 158 -4.78 -1.49 -3.2 .62 
LnNet Interest Margin(INTM) 158 -4.82 -1.45 -3.16 .62 
LnAssets/GDP (DMBA) 158 -3.91 .82 -.95 .93 
LnMarket Cap. (MCAP) 158 -2.7 6.33 3.36 1.34 
Bank Concentration (BCONC) 158 .16 1.00 .68 .20 
Government ownership (GOV) 158 .00 .96 .16 .21 
Panel C: Macroeconomic environment 
LnGDP/CAP (GDP/CAP) 158 4.5 11.58 7.99 1.58 
LnInflation (INF) 158 -4.07 10.10 1.48 1.22 
GDP growth (GDPG) 158 -11.58 9.92 -.012 2.75 
Real Interest rate (RIR) 158 -.72 93.92 7.73 12.08 
Panel D: Property rights institutions 
Legal Structure (LS) 158 1.51 9.62 5.63 1.81 
Political Structure (POLITY2) 158 -10 10 3.82 6.40 
Size of government (SG) 158 2.42 9.35 6.03 1.34 
Sound money (SM) 158 .00 9.84 7.85 1.54 
Freedom to trade(FT) 158 2.73 9.78 6.85 1.05 
Regulation (REG) 158 1.54 8.90 6.03 1.13 
Summary index(SI) 158 2.35 8.93 6.48 .93 
 
Variable definitions are reported in Table 1.  
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Table 3 
Correlation matrix for the study variables 
 
 Variable definitions are reported in Table 1.  (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, in a 2-tailed test.  
 
  
 CSTNC ROA OVHD INTM DMBA MCAP BCONC GOV GDP/Cap INF GDPG RIR LS POLITY2 SG SM FT REG SI  
CSTNC 1                    
ROA -.357** 1                   
OVHD .521** .280** 1                  
INTM .177** .441** .762** 1                 
DMBA -.113* -.383** -.537** -.640** 1                
MCAP -.232** -.167* -.455** -.481** .688** 1               
BCONC -.052 .127* .041 -.005 -.194** .088 1              
GOV .009 -.002 .107 .142* -.184** -.228** -.088 1             
GDP/Cap -.062 -.225** -.395** -.559** .744** .615** -.138** -.280** 1            
INF .053 .361** .373** .498** -.364** -.525** -.067 .255** -.336** 1           
GDPG -.019 -.021 -.071 -.101 .118* .128* -.013 -.041 .242** -.013 1          
RIR .149** .064 .317** .344** -.068 -.276** -.105 .057 -.161** -.094 -.066 1         
LS -.125* -.208** -.422** -.629** .695** .502** .085 -.226 .780** -.343** .168** -.229** 1        
POLITY2 .397** -.244** .164** -.072 .404** .093 -.136* -.243 .362** -.119* .061 .084 .322** 1       
SG .050 .032 .127* .183** -.040 -.033 -.162** .031 -.118* .028 -.128* .198** -.247** .030 1      
SM -.012 -.303** -.331** -.487** .565** .344** -.045 -.388 .568** -.503** .052 -.080 .529** .373** .105* 1     
FT .048 -.193** -.223** -.407** .550** .310** -.055 -.323** .655** -.279** .136* -.146* .612** .435** .026 .598** 1    
REG -.181 .061 -.293** -.381** .560** .473** -.095 -.382** .621** -.195** .113* -.223** .627** .295** .088 .467** .514** 1   
SI -.069 -.196** -.357** -.536** .710** .481** -.067 -.368** .756** -.401** .107* -.148* .777** .429** .254** .805** .787** .779** 1  
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Table 4 
Analysis of variance of bank performance characteristics and institutional environment across 
countries across all income groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable definitions are reported in Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
  
  Sum of Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Bank Performance:      
LnCost/Income (CSTNC) Between Groups .045 .045 .474 .492 
 Within Groups 35.19 .094   
 Total 35.23    
LnReturn on Assets (ROA) Between Groups 6.09 6.09 9.51 .002 
 Within Groups 203.62 .640   
 Total 209.72    
Institutional Quality:      
Legal Structure  (LS) Between Groups 519.15 519.15 213.15 .000 
 Within Groups 857.32 2.43   
 Total 1376.47    
Political Structure (POLITY2)  
Between Groups 
 
2217.95 
 
2217.95 
 
62.37 
 
.000 
 Within Groups 13868.41 35.56   
 Total 16086.36    
Size of Gov. (SG) Between Groups 10.82 10.82 5.01 .026 
 Within Groups 760.17 2.16   
 Total 771.00    
Sound Money (SM) Between Groups 139.47 139.47 59.68 .000 
 Within Groups 822.63 2.33   
 Total 962.11    
Free Trade (FT) Between Groups 114.66 114.66 115.06 .000 
 Within Groups 349.77 .997   
 Total 464.44    
Regulations (REG) Between Groups 118.01 118.01 103.59 .000 
 Within Groups 400.99 1.13   
 Total 519.00    
Summary Index (SI) Between Groups 113.18 113.18 155.16 .000 
 Within Groups 256.76 .729   
 Total 369.94    
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Table 5 
Fixed effects models of the relationship between bank cost inefficiency and PRI quality 
 
 
Variable definitions are reported in Table 1. Standardized beta coefficients are reported, with t-values presented in 
parentheses. VIF is the variable inflation factor. (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively, on the basis of a 2-tailed test. 
Dependent variable: cost/income (COSTINC) 
 
 
(1) 
 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) (8) 
Constant .113 (.399) 
-.243 
(-.785) 
-.227 
(-.745) 
-.172 
(-.485) 
-.138 
(-.418) 
-.814 
(-2.32) 
-.040 
(-.113) 
-.223 
(-.553) 
LnOverhead  (OVHD) .388 (8.27)*** 
.384 
(8.35)*** 
.356 
(7.62)*** 
.386 
(8.34)*** 
.385 
(8.36)*** 
.358 
(7.89)*** 
.385 
(8.38)*** 
.385 
(8.28)*** 
LnNet Int Margin (INTM) -.173 (-3.23)*** 
-.220 
(-3.96)*** 
-.207 
(-3.78)*** 
-.220 
(-3.94)*** 
-.227 
(-4.05)*** 
-.212 
(-3.93)*** 
-.225 
(-4.04)*** 
-.221 
(-3.94)*** 
Assets/GDP (DMBA) .038 (.944) 
.021 
(.528) 
.016 
(.403) 
.023 
(.565) 
.022 
(.554) 
.015 
(.381) 
.011 
(.262) 
.021 
(.528) 
LnMarket Cap (MCAP) -.019 (-.940) 
-.003 
(-.169) 
.001 
(.034) 
-.003 
(-.123) 
-.005 
(-.241) 
.000 
(.021) 
-.002 
(-.112) 
-.003 
(-.166) 
Bank Conc. (BCONC) .020 (.198) 
.104 
(1.01) 
.101 
(1.00) 
.100 
(.970) 
.0013 
(1.09) 
.067 
(.674) 
.090 
(.874) 
.104 
(1.01) 
Gov. ownership (GOV) .074 (.743) 
.111 
(1.12) 
.115 
(1.19) 
.108 
(1.09) 
.078 
(.752) 
.196 
(1.98)* 
.052 
(.464) 
.107 
(1.00) 
LnGDP/CAP(GDP/CAP) .027 (1.38) 
.064 
(2.68)*** 
.044 
(1.77)* 
.062 
(2.52)** 
.066 
(2.75)*** 
.058 
(2.53)** 
.063 
(2.66)*** 
.064 
(2.66)*** 
LnInflation rate (INF) -.002 (-.079) 
.002 
(.097) 
.003 
(.123) 
.000 
(.020)** 
-.003 
(-.127) 
.001 
(.051) 
-.002 
(-.090) 
.002 
(.074) 
GDP growth (GDPG) -.007 (-.840) 
-.007 
(-.784) 
-.003 
(-.395) 
-.007 
(-.805) 
-.007 
(-.847) 
-.006 
(-.745) 
-.009 
(-1.00) 
-.007 
(-.785) 
Interest rate (RIR) -.001 (-.542) 
-.001 
(-.318) 
-.001 
(-.533) 
-.001 
(-.255) 
.000 
(-.119) 
.000 
(.034) 
-.001 
(-.252) 
-.001 
(-.299) 
Legal Structure (LS)  -.046 (-2.57)** 
-.043 
(-2.41)** 
-.047 
(-2.60)*** 
-.044 
(-2.39)** 
-.065 
(-3.53)*** 
-.036 
(-1.75)* 
-.045 
(-2.03)** 
Pol. structure (POLITY2)   .010 (2.44)**   
   
Size of Gov.(SG)    -.006 (-.416)  
   
Sound Money (SM)     -.017 (-.949) 
   
Free Trade (FT)      .091 (3.20)*** 
  
Regulation (REG)       -.039 (-1.12) 
 
Summary Index (SI)        -.003 (-.078) 
Year (YR) Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
R2 .44 .44 .44 .47 .44 .44 .42 .41 
Adjusted R2 .39 .38 .39 .42 .39 .38 .37 .36 
Durbin-Watson  1.68 1.71 1.73 1.71 1.68 .173 1.69 1.70 
F-statistic, (p-value) 8.57*** 9.30*** 8.81*** 8.55*** 8.73*** 10.06*** 8.90*** 8.52*** 
Max/Min VIF 2.99/1.06 3.31/1.06 3.50/1.09 3.31/1.06 3.39/1.07 3.31/1.06 3.45/1.08 4.28/1.07 
Valid N  158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 
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Table 6 
Models of the relationship between bank profitability and PRI quality  
Details of study variables are reported in Table 1. Standardized beta coefficients are reported, with t-values 
presented in parentheses. VIF is the variable inflation factor. (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively, on the basis of a 2-tailed test. 
 
  
 Dependent variable: Return on Assets (LnROA) 
 
 
(1) 
 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) (8) 
Constant -2.18 (-2.71)*** 
-1.12 
(-1.27) 
-1.12 
(-1.27) 
-.484 
(-.483) 
-.507 
(-.548) 
-.984 
(-.941) 
-1.71 
(-1.68) 
-.007 
(-.006) 
LnOverhead  (OVHD) .551 (3.40)*** 
.509 
(3.20)*** 
.514 
(3.20)*** 
.526 
(3.30)*** 
.527 
(3.35)*** 
.510 
(3.19)*** 
.497 
(3.12)*** 
.532 
(3.35)*** 
LnNet Int Margin (INTM) .059 (.377) 
.224 
(1.35) 
.223 
(1.33) 
.226 
(1.36) 
.175 
(1.05) 
.226 
(1.35) 
.244 
(1.46) 
.203 
(1.22) 
Assets/GDP (DMBA) -.073 (-.630) 
-.027 
(-.232) 
-.025 
(-.219) 
-.011 
(-.095) 
-.019 
(-.171) 
-.026 
(-.221) 
.004 
(.031) 
-.021 
(-.183) 
LnMarket Cap (MCAP) -.079 (-1.40) 
-.123 
(-2.13)** 
-.124 
(-2.13)** 
-.114 
(-1.98)* 
-.131 
(-2.30)** 
-.123 
(-2.13)** 
-.126 
(-2.18)** 
-.120 
(-2.10)** 
Bank Conc. (BCONC) -.228 (-.814) 
-.485 
(-1.67)* 
-.486 
(-1.66)* 
-.522 
(-1.79)* 
-.431 
(-1.49) 
-.478 
(-1.63) 
-.446 
(-1.52) 
-.492 
(-1.70)* 
Gov. ownership (GOV) -.525 (-1.86)* 
-.646 
(-2.31)** 
-.649 
(-2.31)** 
-.669 
(-2.39)** 
-.835 
(-2.86)*** 
-.669 
(-2.27)** 
-.475 
(-1.50) 
-.827 
(-2.74)*** 
LnGDP/CAP(GDP/CAP) -.008 (-.152) 
-.124 
(-1.80)* 
-.118 
(-1.63) 
-.144 
(-2.04)** 
-.112 
(-1.63) 
-.124 
(-1.79)* 
-.124 
(-1.80)* 
-.133 
(-1.93)* 
LnInflation rate (INF) -.008 (-.126) 
-.019 
(-.313) 
-.019 
(-.316) 
-.034 
(-.551) 
-.048 
(-.778) 
-.019 
(-.309) 
-.007 
(-.117) 
-.044 
(-.702) 
GDP growth (GDPG) -.023 (-.948) 
-.024 
(-1.00) 
-.025 
(-1.03) 
-.026 
(-1.08) 
-.028 
(-1.16) 
-.024 
(-1.00) 
-.018 
(-.730) 
-.029 
(-1.19) 
Interest rate (RIR) -.008 (-1.26) 
-.009 
(-1.51) 
-.009 
(-1.47) 
-.008 
(-1.31) 
-.007 
(-1.09) 
-.009 
(-1.52) 
-.009 
(-1.57) 
-.007 
(-1.24) 
LnCost/income (CSTNC) -1.47 (-6.25)*** 
-1.34 
(-5.67)*** 
-1.32 
(-5.49)*** 
-1.35 
(-5.73)*** 
-1.37 
(-5.87)*** 
-1.32 
(-5.40)*** 
-1.31 
(-5.55)*** 
-1.34 
(-5.71)*** 
Legal Structure (LS)  .140 (2.68)*** 
.139 
(2.66)*** 
.131 
(2.51)** 
.155 
(2.96)*** 
.145 
(2.58)** 
.109 
(1.87)* 
.196 
(3.09)*** 
Pol. Structure. (POLITY2)   -.003 (-.274)     
 
Size of Gov.(SG)    -.054 (-1.33)    
 
Sound Money (SM)     -.103 (-2.00)**   
 
Free Trade (FT)      -.022 (-.255)  
 
Regulation (REG)       .116 (1.16) 
 
Summary Index (SI)        -.190 (-1.54) 
Year (YR) Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
R2 
.40 .43 .43 .43 
.44 .43 .43 .44 
Adjusted R2 .34 .37 .37 .38 .38 .37 .37 .38 
Durbin-Watson  1.41 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.47 1.43 1.50 1.43 
F-statistic, (p-value) 7.48*** 6.58*** 6.03*** 6.04*** 6.34*** 6.03*** 7.07*** 6.03*** 
Max/Min VIF 3.34/1.06 3.61/1.06 3.61/1.09 3.38/1.07 3.37/1.07 3.64/1.06 3.65/1.08 4.31/1.07 
Valid N  158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 
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Table 7 
Models of the relationship between bank efficiency, bank profitability and PRI quality by 
country income level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable definitions are reported in Table1. Standardized beta coefficients are reported, with t-values presented in 
parentheses. VIF is the variable inflation factor. (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively, on the basis of a 2-tailed test. 
 
 
 
 
 LnCost/income (CSTNC) LnReturn on Assets (ROA) 
 
Low and lower 
middle income 
level countries  
Upper middle 
and high 
income level 
countries 
Low and 
lower middle 
income level 
countries 
Upper middle 
and high 
income level 
countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -.134 (-.127) 
-.594 
(-1.29) 
2.82 
(.985) 
.378 
(.273) 
LnOverhead  (OVHD) .516 (3.47)*** 
.346 
(6.49)*** 
1.61 
(3.36)*** 
.563 
(2.95)*** 
LnNet Int Margin (INTM) -.378 (-3.64)*** 
-.183 
(-2.61)*** 
-.021 
(-.062) 
.296 
(1.36) 
Assets/GDP (DMBA) .080 (.724) 
-.004 
(-.073) 
.547 
(1.81)* 
-.037 
(-.258) 
LnMarket Cap (MCAP) -.020 (-.447) 
.001 
(.023) 
-.282 
(-2.32)** 
-.134 
(-1.77)* 
Bank Conc. (BCONC) -.195 (-1.01) 
.141 
(1.19) 
-.197 
(-.372) 
-.602 
(-1.68)* 
Gov. ownership (GOV) -.112 (-.532) 
.111 
(.795) 
.335 
(.582) 
-.907 
(-2.15) 
LnGDP/CAP(GDP/CAP) .082 (1.26) 
.093 
(2.08)** 
-.128 
(-.708) 
-.255 
(-1.85)* 
LnInflation rate (INF) -.077 (-1.04) 
.013 
(.545) 
-.352 
(-1.72)* 
-.035 
(-.489) 
GDP growth (GDPG) .000 (-.006) 
-.010 
(-.991) 
-.040 
(-.925) 
-.027 
(-.876) 
Interest rate (RIR) -.006 (-1.33) 
-.001 
(-.491) 
-.033 
(-2.75)*** 
-.009 
(-1.08) 
LnCost/income (CSTNC)   -1.00 (-1.99)* 
-1.55 
(-5.16)*** 
Legal Structure (LS) .006 (.178) 
-.069 
(-2.73)*** 
.262 
(2.87)*** 
.196 
(2.50)** 
Pol. Structure (POLITY2) .008 (1.38) 
.013 
(2.59)** 
.00 
(.071) 
-.013 
(-.694) 
Year (YR) Included Included Included Included 
R2 .60 .52 .60 .47 
Adjusted R2 .40 .45 .39 .38 
Durbin-Watson  2.43 1.76 2.40 1.58 
F-statistic, (p-value) 3.35*** 7.60*** 2.15* 4.76*** 
Max/Min VIF 4.82/1.33 3.74 7.48/1.45 3.74/1.12 
Valid N  44 114 44 114 
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